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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE DUGAN, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants 
Cross-Defendants and Respon-
dents, 
vs. 
LUTHER EUGENE JONES and BETTY 
ELVIRA JONES, husband and wife, 
Defendants, Counter-Claimants,: 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Third-
Party Counter-Defendants and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
O. B. OBERHANSLY, LESTER CLAN 
STILSON, UNITED FARM AGENCY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
Counter-Claimants, Fourth-
Party Plaintiffs, and Respon-
dents, 
vs. 
CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE DUGAN 
husband and wife, 
Fourth-Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16334 
These defendants do not dispute appellants' characteriza-
lion of the case except to explain that the action of the 
third-party defendants, who are also fourth-party plaintiffs 
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against the fourth-party defendants, Dugans, has been resolved, 
Dugans, having paid the judgment awarded the fourth-party 
plaintiffs, therefore, that matter is not at issue on this 
appeal. The disposition in the lower court, therefore, must 
be corrected accordingly to reflect the judgment awarded to 
the fourth-party plaintiff against the fourth-party defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These defendants seek to have the judgment of the trial 
court confirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as recited by the appellants is 
deficient in the following particulars: 
The appellants failed to mention that the information 
related to the Jones by Mr. Oberhansly was based entirely 
upon representations made to Oberhansly by the Dugans. (R. 
265, 266, 411) Oberhansly did not know that there was a 
discrepancy between the amount of acreage stated in the 
listing agreement as given to him by the Dugans and the 
amount of acreage that was in fact included in the contract 
between the Dugans to the Jones. (R. 411, 412) 
The transaction between the parties was closed in the 
office of the seller's attorney, Mr. John Beaslin, in 
Vernal, Utah, and the third-party defendants were not present, 
nor were they requested to do anything toward completing the 
sale of the property. The deed descriptions were obtained 
by Mr. Beaslin or others. (R. 439) These defendants had 
no knowledge of the contents of the closing documents and in 
-2-
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fact had no knowledge that Dugans had not given Jones an 
acre of ground for a separate home site. Further, they had 
no knowledge that the description contained in the deed was 
in any respect at variance with the acreage described in the 
listing agreement or as set forth in the deposit receipt and 
agreement of sale. At the closing, Jones inspected the 
documents and made no claim against the Dugans and raised no 
objection to the fact that there was a discrepancy in acreage, 
or that they did not receive clear title to a parcel of 
ground of approximately an acre for the purpose of construe-
ting a home. These facts were unknown to these defendants 
at the time but are reflected in the record. (Mrs. Jones 
deposition, pp. 25, 26) 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING APPELLANTS' REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL. 
The appellants were not entitled to a jury trial for 
two reasons: 
1. The issues before the court were primarily equit-
able, and 
2. The appellants failed to make a timely demand for a 
jury trial. 
In non-federal jurisdictions the general rule obtains 
that it is discretionary with the trial court to grant a 
jury trial when there is a mixed question of law and equity. 
The trial court, in the exercise of sound discretion, may 
<1Ptermine the primary nature of the case and try the case in 
accordance with its determination. If the issues are primarily 
-3-
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equitable, the trial court is totally within its perogative 
in refusing a jury trial. State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 
565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977); Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc. 18 
Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966); Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 529 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1974); Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 
p. 2d 2 50 ( 19 58 ) . 
The appellants lay great stress on the Beacon Theatres 
case which is a federal decision. The appellants fail to 
explain to the court that under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure if there be any legal question the litigant has an 
absolute right to a jury trial. (FRCP 38) This generally 
has been the federal interpretation, however, the federal 
rule concerning jury trial does not apply to state jurisdic-
tions and Utah has always adhered to the general rule above 
stated. 47 Am.Jur.2d Jury, §9; Holland, supra, State Bank 
of Lehi, supra., Sweeney, supra. It is, therefore, obvious 
that appellants prime authority is not in point as a matter 
of law. 
It is the fundamental precept of law that the foreclosure 
of a mortgage is strictly and exclusively an equitable 
remedy. State Bank of Lehi, supra. That, of course, was 
the nature of the initial complaint and the basis for this 
proceeding. The court pretrial requested Mr. Holland, 
appellants' counsel, to explain what he wanted in his complaint. 
Colloquy between the court and counsel for appellants is as 
follows: 
-4-
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THE COURT: Okay. What do you want to accomplish, 
aside from resisting the action to foreclose, what 
do you want to have happen? 
MR. HOLLAND: I either want 16 and, lets see, 
what would that be, about 16 and four-tenths, three 
point five acres. 
it. 
THE COURT: They haven't got it, have they? 
MR. HOLLAND: No, but maybe they should get 
THE COURT: How could they get it? 
MR. HOLLAND: They could buy it from the 
adjacent people in the adjacent property. 
THE COURT: Well I'm not sure that that's 
practical. But do you want the reformation of any 
instrument? 
MR. HOLLAND: No. I think we just sued generally 
rather than for specific money damages. 
THE COURT: What are you suing for specific 
performance on? 
MR. HOLLAND: For the balance of the property. 
(Pre-trial R. p. 9, lines 3-25) 
The right to specific performance of a contract is 
equitable. Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974), 
Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963), conseq-
quently, the plaintiff had asked for equitable relief in the 
foreclosure of the mortgage and the defendants had asked for 
equitable relief in the form of specific performance. Both 
were equitable questions and were the primary issues of the 
litigation, consequently, the court was entirely within its 
perogative in declining the defendants request for jury 
trial. Bradshaw, supra.; Holland, supra.; State Bank of Lehi, 
supra.; Sweeney, supra. 
Addressing the second point, the case was commenced in 
January, 1977. Pretrial hearing was conducted on January 
24, 1978, at which time all of the parties were represented. 
At that time the following colloquy took place: 
-5-
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THE COURT: Alright. Well, I guess you have 
got a lawsuit. What about a jury? Mortgage fore-
closure. You are not entitled to one. 
MR. NASH: No, we don't want a jury. 
THE COURT: When do you want to try it, since 
you are the plaintiff, and you the main defendant, 
and you just going along for the ride? 
MR. HOLLAND: Depending on when it's set is 
who will be assisting me in trial, and we'll file 
a notice with the court at that time. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MR. HOLLAND: From my office. 
THE COURT: If I set it today there will be a 
trial setting. 
MR. HOLLAND: Yes, I understand that, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: O.K. Now when can't you try it? 
(Pre-trial R., p. 30, lines 19-30, p. 31, lines 1-6) 
It is obvious that at the time of the pretrial Mr. Holland 
did not demand a jury even though he knew that the case was 
going to be tried by the court without a jury. 
The case, in fact, was not tried on April 17th and 18th 
but was continued a number of times until December 5, 1978, 
when it was actually tried. On September 18, 1978, the 
defendants, Jones, filed a request for a jury trial. (R. 
156, 157) The third-party defendants promptly filed an 
objection to a demand for a jury trial on the basis that the 
issues in the case were primarily equitable. (R. 158, 159) 
Each party filed memorandums of authority. The court reviewed 
the memorandums and took the matter in advisement and entered 
a minute order declining to grant a trial by jury. The 
court's order was entered November 24, 1978. ( R. 161) 
It should be noted that the matter had been set for 
trial twice before the date the defendants' demand for jury 
trial had been received. The previous trial dates had been 
-6-
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vacated for the convenience of the parties. The Court was 
within its perogative in determining that the request of the 
defendant was untimely in light of the fact that the matter 
had been pending, ready for trial for the most of the year 
and that the defendant had made no substantial showing of the 
right to a jury trial. 
In the case, Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Universal 
C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045 
(1955), the appellants made a demand for jury trial more 
than a month after the hearing for trial date. In refusing 
the appellant's request, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
"A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demand." 
The effect of this provision has been interpreted in 
the Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. West, 55 
Utah 357, 186 P.ll4 and Thompson v. Anderson, 107 
Utah 331, 153 P.2d 665, holding that a litigant not 
making demand for a jury trial as required by court 
rule has no right to a jury trial and that the matter 
becomes one of discretion of the court. Where, as here, 
no valid excuse for the failure to make the demand 
timely was offered, there is no abuse of discretion on 
the part of the trial court in denying a latter demand. 
(See also Christensen v. Cordova, 24 Utah 2d 132, 467 
p . 2d 4 0 5 ( 19 7 0 ) ) • 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED THE INTRODUCTION 
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY BY APPELLANTS 
At the time of the pre-trial on January 24, 1978, the 
parties all represented to the court that they were ready 
for trial. (Pre-trial R. pp. 30, 31) The pre-trial proceeding 
was extensive and the third-party defendants ordered a copy 
of the transcript from the reporter so that the rulings of 
the Court pertaining to the manner in which the trial would 
-7-
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be conducted would be preserved. The Court did not require 
any of the parties to prepare a written pretrial order nor 
did the Court itself prepare a pretrial order. The question 
of calling witnesses, however, were important to all of the 
parties, therefore it was presumed by third-party defendants 
that each of the counsel present took copius notes of the 
requirements of the Court. At least counsel for the third-
party defendants was aware of the pre-trial orders of the 
court. In preparing for trial it would have been necessary 
for the third-party defendants to obtain expert witnesses 
for the purposes of meeting expert testimony which may have 
been proffered by the defendants. While two of the third-
party defendants are in fact experts in the real estate 
business and could have testified in any respect, nevertheless, 
they were parties and would have desired to have independent 
experts available for issues that may have been raised by 
the expert witnesses, if any, of the defendants. For that 
reason, there was specific mention at the pre-trial confer-
ence of the question of damages and the manner of proof. 
The colloquy between the court and counsel pertaining to the 
issues raised by appellant on this point is as follows: 
THE COURT: All right. I am going to order you 
as part of this pretrial order to furnish the names 
of the witnesses, the expert witnesses that you will 
call with regard to damages not later than 15 days 
prior to the time of trial. 
MR. HOLLAND: I understand, your Honor. 
THE COURT: O.K. Now do you intend to call 
any experts at this time, Mr. Nash? 
MR. NASH: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: How about you Mr. Valentine? 
MR. VALENTINE: We have no intent at this time, 
your Honor, but will comply with the court's order 
and do that. 
-8-
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THE COURT: If you do then you will be 
required to furnish the names within ten days prior 
to that time; the difference being whether you call 
them or whether you don't may depend on the ones 
that he intends to call. 
MR. VALENTINE: Yes. 
THE COURT: For that reason, he can furnish 
them to you first, since he is going to have to 
carry the burden of proof in that regard. (Pre-
trial R., p. 28, lines 14-30, p. 29, lines 1-4) 
As a matter of clarification, Mr. Valentine, was appearing 
for the third-party defendants. 
It is apparent that everyone understood the requirement 
of furnishing the names of expert witnesses. It was not a 
mean or inconsequential duty. The ability of the plaintiff 
and the third-party defendants to defend the issues presented 
was directly related to the type and character of testimony 
and evidence proffered. When defendants failed to name expert 
witnesses the other parties to the action had a right to rely 
upon there being no need for them to obtain rebuttal experts 
and, therefore, they themselves abandoned their opportunities 
to defend against plaintiff's expert witnesses. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANTS AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS WERE COMPETENT 
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY AS TO THE VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY 
The third-party defendants do not dispute the general 
contention of the appellants on this point. We merely state 
that the facts and the law do not correspond. 
The appellants attempted to establish the value of the 
property by having Mrs. Jones tell the court what their 
excludecl expert witness, llr. Carroll, would have testified. 
The court properly excluded her attempt to paraphrase or 
characterize the testimony of an expert witness. Mrs. Jones 
-9-
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did not have any independent opinion as to the value of the 
property (R. 381, 382), and there was no other evidence 
introduced directly on the point. Furthermore the court was 
not obligated to attach any credence to the appellants 
attempt to determine value by an oblique reference to the 
value of the improvements, thereby concluding that the dif-
ference between the sale price of the property and that which 
was testified to be the value of certain improvements must, 
therefore, be the acreage value of the land. The court was 
the trier of fact and it is axiomatic that where there is evi-
dence in conflict or testimony proffered of such dubious quality 
as to be improbable, the court is not bound to attach any signi-
ficance to such testimony as desired by the appellant. 
POINT IV 
THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS DID lJOT BREACH 
ANY DUTY OWED TO THE THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS. 
The citations submitted by the appellants are not dis-
puted except in their application to the facts. The diffi-
culty with the appellants position is that there was no inten-
tional reckless misrepresentation of a material fact by the 
defendants. Appellants simply want to impute liability to 
these defendants for what was apparently a mistake in the acre-
age owned by the plaintiffs. The sweeping assertions of the 
appellants simply do not apply, third-party defendants will 
address this argument under four subpoints: 
A. In misrepresentation cases a real estate agent is 
not required to act as a fiduciary towards prospective 
purchasers of his principal's property. 
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Utah Law is well settled that in misrepresentation cases 
a real estate agent does not woe a fiduciary duty to all 
petential purchasers of his principal's property. Raterh, 
the disparity in experience and business activity between such 
parties is one of several elements to consider, including pur-
chaser's diligence in investigating the truthfulness of the 
broker's statement. 
"No matter how naive or inexperienced the defendants 
were they could not close their eyes and accept 
unquestioningly any representations made to them. 
It was their duty to make such investigation and 
inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances 
would dictate; • Lewis v. ~~hite 2 Utah 2d 
101, 103, 104, 269 P.2d 865, 866 (1954) 
A potential purchaser of real estate cannot blindly rely on a 
broker's statement as would be the case if he were the purchaser's 
fiduciary. 37 Am.Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit, §§ 253, 254. 
The authorities cited by the appellants in support of 
their fiduciary theory are either inapplicable to or distin-
guishable from the present controversy. First, appellants 
references to U.C.A. section 61-2-6 is irrelevant since this 
statute, by its very terms, deals solely with the licensing 
of real estate brokers by the state; it has nothing to do 
with alleged fraudulent transactions between a broker and a 
private party. Second, the cited Florida case is not con-
trolling in this state, and it conflicts with the clearly 
applicable standard outlined in Lewis v. White, supra. 
Third, Greig v. Interstate Investment Co., 253 P. 877 (Ore. 
1927), is distinguishable from the present action since the 
misrepresentation in that case concerned the dollar value of the 
~urchased property, which amount was never received from 
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the seller rather calculated solely by the broker. Fourth, 
Motter v. Bateman, 18 Utah 2d 335, 423 P.2d 153 (1967), 
merely recites the previously discussed rule outlined in 
Lewis v. White. Fifth, all references to Mr. Stilson's testi-
mony at a previous State Administrative hearing are inadmis-
sable hearsay since they fail to qualify under Rule 63(3){b) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence and especially because Mr. Stil-
son was fully available for questioning when his deposition 
was taken. Sixth, the language of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1948), clearly 
indicates that a real estate agent has a fiduciary duty only 
to the principal who engages his services. In application to 
this case the meaning is clear that the duty of respondents 
flowed solely to Dugan, and they, as seller's agent, owed no 
such duty to buyer Jones. E.g. Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 
300 P.2d 623 (1956); 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers §84. 
B. Oberhansly acted in good faith with justifiable 
reliance and, therefore, cannot be held liable for the mistake of 
Dugan or even the fraud of Dugan if such be the case. 
The law clearly states that unless a real estate agent 
has some reason to know that the fact which he is listing is 
untrue, he cannot be held responsible or liable for his prin-
ciples misrepresentations. Smith v. Pearmain, 548 P.2d 1269 
(Utah 1976) (by implication); Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 
384 P.2d 802 (1963); Graham v. Ellmore, 135 C.A. 129, 26 P.2d 
646 (1933); Carpenter v. Egli, 272 Ore. 337, 536 P.2d 1236 (1975) 
(by implication); see also 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers §108 and 27 A.L.R. 
'i<J §13. 
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The primary issue in this case is whether the third-
party defendants willfully and knowingly misrepresented the 
number of acres owned by Mr. Dugan. If this crucial element 
is lacking, the third-party defendants cannot be held liable 
for fraud. 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit §188. 
As stated above, the prevailing view in both this state 
and in other jurisdictions support the proposition that a 
real estate agent will be held liable for fraud only if he 
knowingly participates in the actual fraudulent act: innocent 
involvement is not actionable. 
The main paoint urged is that the judgment must be 
entered also against a real estate salesmen when 
both he and the owner have made a false representation, 
even though the salesmen believes the statement made 
to have been true, and even though the same representation 
had been made to him by the owner. 
* * * 
While in the instant case the court found that the 
statement made by the salesmen was untrue, it was 
also found that he believed it to be true, that he 
did not know of the existence of the other incum-
brance, and that he had been told by the owner that 
only one incumbrance existed. 
* * * 
The facts in connection with the condition of this 
title were peculiarly within the knowledge of the onwer, 
the salesmen was as much deceived by the owner as was 
the other party to the transaction, and in one sense it 
was no more unnatural or unreasonable for the salesmen 
to examine the records than for the respondents to make 
the same error. In effect, the court found that, while 
the agents made the statement and that it was false, it 
was neither willfully made nor fraudulent so far as he 
was concerned, since he knew nothing of the other incum-
brance, and since he was justified by his information 
in thinking the title was as represented. Also in 
effect, the court found that the appellants relied upon 
the statements innocently made by the salesmen and 
wrongfully and knowingly made by the owner." Graham v. 
Ellmore, 135 C.A. 129, 26 P.2d 696 697 (1933); 37 Am. 
Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §322. 
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In the present case the two key parties to the listing 
agreement, Mr. Dugan and Mr. Oberhansly, both testified that 
the defendants received the incorrect 22 3/4 acreage figure 
directly from Mr. Dugan. (R. 265, 266, 411, 412) The pre-
cise number of acres was thus "solely within the knowledge 
of the owner," and, with no reason to doubt the figure, 
these defendants "believed the statement to have been true;" 
consequently, they were "as much deceived by the owner as was 
the other party to the transaction" and certainly cannot be 
held liable for willfully and knowingly misrepresenting the 
number of acres in Mr. Dugan's property. Rather, the author 
of this 22 3/4 acre figure, Mr. Dugan, and not his innocent 
agent, Oberhansly, should be held responsible for the injuries, 
if any, suffered by these appellants. 
C. Stilson must be dismissed from the case as a 
matter of law since he did not actively participate in any 
fraud or misrepresentation and cannot be held liable simply 
because he was Oberhansly's supervisor. 
Respecting this point, the third-party defendants take 
exception to the reference by the appellants to a portion of 
the transcript before the Security Commission which was not a 
matter of record at the trial, which is out of context, and to 
which these defendants have had no opportunity to present 
evidence or testimony. The third-party defendants exception 
is to the references contained on page 19 of the appellants' 
brief. 
The material allegations of appellants' complaint against 
Stilson are first, two counts of misrepresentation through 
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Stilson's agent Oberhansly, and second, one count of 
negligent supervision of said agent. 
Regarding the negligence count, the third-party defen-
dants note that they were employed solely by the seller to 
sell the land and not by the appellants to purchase it, 
consequently, their fiduciary duty ran to Dugan, and they, 
as sellers agent owed no such duty to buyer/appellant Jones. 
Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956). Appel-
lants thus cannot assert a negligence claim against the 
seller's agent's supervisor Stilson for improper supervision. 
Brink v. Martin, 50 Wash.2d 256, 310 P.2d 870 (1957); see also 
Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, 92 Cal.Rptr. 162, 479 P.2d 
362 (1971). 
The misrepresentation counts against Stilson are equally 
without legal and factual foundation. A supervisor of an 
employee cannot be held liable for his salesmen's misrepresen-
tations unless he actively participates in the actual fraudu-
lent act. E.g. Lawrence v. Tye, 46 Ca.2d 877, 116 P.2d 180 
(1941); see also 32 A.L.R. 231 §26. 
The cases are agreed that a director or officer of 
a corporation is not liable, merely because of his 
official character for the fraud or false represen-
tations of the other officers or agents of the corp-
oration or for fraud attributable to the corporation 
itself, if such director or officer is not personally 
connected with the wrong and does not participate in 
it. 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit §322; see also 19 
Am.Jur.2d Corporat1ons §1348. 
The depositions in the instant case clearly demonstrate 
that Stilson was in no way involved in the alleged misrepre-
sentations. The appellants concede that they never met Stilson 
until all of the facts giving rise to their complaint had trans-
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pired. Their first meeting with Stilson was at a Securities 
Exchange Commission hearing wherein the same matters contained 
in appellants' complaint were aired before an administrative 
law judge. (Mr. Jones deposition page 81, lines 5-14) At 
that time, Stilson appeared on behalf of defendant United Farm 
as its broker in Utah but for no other reason. 
Stilson did not participate in any way in the sale of the 
Dugan property to the appellants. (Mr. Jones deposition page 
81, lines 15-25, page 82, lines l-7) It was not until over 
three years after the sale had been consummated that Mr. 
Stilson learned of the complaint of the appellants. (Mrs. 
Jones deposition, p. 31, lines 15-21); (Stilson deposition, 
p. 7, lines 17-25) Appellants cannot and do not have any 
claim against Stilson upon which relief could be granted. 
He was properly dismissed from the case as a matter of law. 
D. Appellants have waived any claim of fraud or 
breach of duty against third-party defendants. 
After the initial Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale 
(Def. Ex. 5) was executed on February 24, 1973, these third-
party defendants had very little to do with the transaction 
except to act as a conduit for one or two communications be-
tween Dugan as seller and Jones as buyer. There were other 
communications between the sellers and buyers to which the 
third-party defendants were in no way privy. 
The sellers and buyers independently arranged for the 
closing of the transaction at the office of the sellers 
attorney, ~lr. John Beaslin in Vernal, Utah. (R. 358, 359) 
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Mr. Beaslin apparently secured information concerning the 
description of the property and prepared the warranty deed 
from Dugan to Jones dated July 2, 1973, and the mortgage from 
Jones to Dugan bearing the same date. (R. 439) There appar-
ently was no reference whatsoever to a parcel of land to be 
excluded from the mortgage or to be subordinated to the mort-
gage. Apparently, the appellants made no objection to the 
description of property either in its size or to the fact 
that there was not an acre separated from the security pro-
visions. (R. 361) 
The appellants had in fact occupied the premises from 
June of 1973 and apparently were cognizant of its dimensions 
at the time the deed and mortgage were executed. 
deposition, page 46, lines 3-9) 
(Mr. Jones 
Furthermore, the testimony and evidence was unrefuted that 
the appellants walked over the premises prior to the initial 
deposit receipt and certainly occupied the premises before 
executing the final documents of purchase. (Mr. Jones depo-
sition, page 46, lines 3-9). They thereafter occupied the 
premises for three and one-half (3-l/2) years before making any 
claim against the third-party defendants for injuries or damage 
they claimed to have sustained by reason of what they, in Feb-
ruary, 1977, labelled the third-party defendants fraud and breach 
of fiduciary duty. (R. 339) 
Jones should have discovered that he did not have 22 3/4 
acres by at least August, 1973. He had been in possession 
since the latter part of June; the land was available and obvious 
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to him and he inspected it. (rlr. Jones deposition, page 59, 
lines 20-25, page 60 line 1). Jones explanation is simply 
that while he bought what he though he bought, he thought 
that the land constituted 22 3/4 acres. He does not contend 
that he did not get what was pointed out to him as the pro-
perty dimensions. (Mr. Jones deposition, page 59, lines 13-25, 
page 60, lines l-6). He merely contends that he thought that 
that which he was buying was 22 3/4 acres instead of 6 even 
though he knew exactly what he was buying in respects to metes 
and bounds. 
Jones does not seek rescision or restitution. He is con-
tent with what he bought. He merely wants an acreage price for 
the number of acres he claims he did not get. 
in Utah that: 
It is settled 
One who claims to be defrauded must exercise 
reasonable prudence and diligence in discovering 
it and seeking a remedy therefore, or be precluded 
from doing so. 
One who has entered into a contract where 
fraud may be involved and after having knowledge 
of those facts continues to perform or otherwise 
ratify the contract, is deemed to have waived 
the claim of fraud. Bezner v. Continental Dry 
Cleaners, Inc. 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976). 
See also Glenn Dick Equipment Co. v. Galey 
Construct~on, Inc, 97 Id. 216, 541 P.2d 1184 
(1975) 
Further, it is clear that: Actual knowledge of fraud is not a 
prerequisite of ratification; notice of acts and cicumstances 
which would put a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence upon 
inquiry is equivalent in the eyes of the law to knowledge of 
all the facts a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose. 
Housley v. Linton Plywood Association, 210 Ore. 520, 311 P.2d 
432 (1957) 
Judge Bullock, therefore, was well within the parameters 
of the testimony and evidence when he observed in his tentative 
decision: 
-18-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
However, by entering into possession and remain-
ing in possession from July, 1973, to the present 
time, and accepting the benefits from their pur-
chase, i.e., use and occupation of the property 
and operating the store, and further, by paying 
regular monthly payments called for by the note 
for more than three years after entering into 
possession; and by now declining to amend the 
third-party complaint to pray for rescision of 
the contract the court believes the acreage defi-
ciency has been waived. 
The appellants, by their pleading, and by their conduct, 
specifically waived any right against the third-party defen-
dants based upon breach of fiduciary duty or fraud. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS FAILED TO ALLEGE A CLAIM OF FRAUD OR 
MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS. 
In searching the complaint of the appellants it is appa-
rent that they have not alleged with particularity and with 
certainty the misrepresentations made by these defendants nor 
have they alleged what they deemed to be the truth juxtaposed 
against the representations of fraud. Such deficiencies can-
not sustain an action for fraud. Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 8(c), 9(b). 
For example, the complaint is absolutely devoid of any 
reference of fraud or breach of fiduciary duties by the defen-
dant Lester Clan Stilson. The entire contention of the appel-
lants against Stilson seems to be that he was a supervisor of 
Oberhansly. There is no dispute that he knew nothing of the 
transaction until the fall of 1976. The complaint is totally 
devoid of any suggestion that defendant United Farm Agency, 
knew or should have known, participated in, acquiesced in, or 
ractified any of the conduct of Oberhansly which is deemed to 
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be fraudulent or a breach of duty. There is nothing in the 
complaint that would allow the court to enter judgment 
against either Stilson or United Farm Agency based upon 
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. 
In respect to Oberhansly, the allegations of fraud are 
totally deficient. An inspection of the lengthy complaint, 
including Counts I, II, III and IV will demonstrate clearly 
that the pleading is totally inadequate in alleging a claim 
of fraud. 
Counts III and IV simply state that Oberhansly occupied 
a fiduciary and confidential relationship to the third-party 
plaintiffs and that he breached his duty. The apparent breaches 
presumably were those alleged in Counts I and II which were 
incorporated by reference to wit: that Oberhansly knew or 
should have known that the plaintiff did not own 22-3/4 acres 
and that he subsequently discovered that the plaintiffs had 
breached their oral agreement to convey one acre of ground. 
Such allegations are simply not actionable. This court has 
clearly set forth the requirement for the allegation of fraud 
in Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 227, 
P.791 (1924), and later in Davis Stock Company v. Hill, 2 Utah 
2c~ 288 P.2d 988 (1954). Appellants have failed to meet these 
requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants have failed to state a claim against 
these third-party defendants upon which relief can be granted. 
Tl1<• appellants further failed to introduce evidence or testimony 
-20-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that would allow a judgment against these third-party defen-
dants. The third-party defendants therefore, as a matter of 
law, had to be dismissed from the action and the trial court 
had no other alternative under the status of the pleadings 
and the evidence before it. 
Assuming arguendo that the appellants were entitled to a 
jury trial or that appellants were entitled to present expert 
testimony as to the value of the property, they nevertheless 
would have been barred from obtaining judgment against these 
third-party defendants by reason of the failures above enun-
ciated. Were the inadequacies of the pleadings or the failures 
of proof insufficient to bar the appellants, they would never-
theless be barred by their acts and conduct in accepting the 
deed, signing the mortgage, and occupying the premises for 
more than 3-l/2 years before complaining of what they belatedly 
deem to be the third-party defendants fraud and breach of fidu-
ciary duty. The acts and conduct of the appellants are incon-
sistent with the allegations. 
The dismissal of the third-party defendants by the District 
Court was proper. The judgment of the District Court in this 
respect, therefore, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of July, 1979. 
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MAILED POSTAGE PREPAID a copy of the foregoing Respondents' 
Brief this bl, QtJ. day of July, 1979 to each of the following: 
J. Kent Holland 
Attorney for Appellants 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
702 Kearns Building 
salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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